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Introduction 
 
 
The Dynamics of a Right-wing Coalition 
How the Failure of the Peace Processes Encourages Domestic Populism in Israel 
Peter Lintl 
Israel has been increasingly criticised for violating substantive democratic principles. 
The trigger was a series of decisions and initiatives. In July 2016, the Knesset adopted 
a stricter transparency law for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) financed from 
abroad, as well as a law empowering it to divest its members of their mandate. For weeks 
and months, government had made various suggestions for closer oversight of cultural 
and media institutions (for instance). There has also been repeated disapproval of Su-
preme Court judgements, which went hand in hand with calls for Parliament to be en-
abled to overrule its verdicts. These advances have had negative repercussions not just 
in Israel, but internationally as well. 
 
The parties of the ruling coalition – Kulanu, 
Yisrael Beitenu, Likud, Shas, Torah Judaism 
and Jewish Home – are located on the right 
of the political spectrum, with the partial 
exception of Kulanu. International and 
Israeli media are calling the government 
“the most right-wing government of all 
time”. While this is a comment referring 
to the parties’ basic political orientation, 
it also points to their political work. Cer-
tain laws and draft bills in particular are 
drawing critical attention from the point 
of view of substantial democracy and its 
premises, such as minority rights, freedom 
of expression and the separation of powers. 
Israel, it is claimed, is moving closer to-
wards a formal democracy, in which sub-
stantive rights can be curtailed by majority 
decision. Debates on such proposals cer-
tainly take up much of the government’s 
time at the moment. However, what is often 
overlooked is that these legal initiatives 
tend to come from a part of the govern-
ment which is seen as populist or radical, 
and is located on the right fringe of the 
political spectrum. Moreover, the forays are 
rarely successful since they fail to obtain 
a majority even within government. None-
theless, they are having an influence on 
the coalition, especially where its agenda-
setting is concerned. 
This puts especially Prime Minister and 
Likud chair Benjamin Netanyahu in a tight 
spot since it forces him to compete for elec-
toral votes with these currents. Because of 
this constellation, political discourse in 
Israel as a whole is moving to the right. The 
strength of the political right wing, how-
ever, can also be explained by Israelis’ dis-
illusionment with the peace process, and 
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the weakness of the opposition parties, 
in particular the Zionist Union. A party’s 
stance on the Middle East conflict and its 
possible solutions continues to be a decisive 
criterion in elections. Thus, widespread 
scepticism in Israeli society about the pros-
pects of the peace process has handed a po-
litical advantage to those right-wing parties 
that have always rejected it. Since an almost 
flawlessly right-wing government is at the 
helms for the first time, its populist compo-
nents are gaining more traction, and are 
trying to push political discourse further 
to the right using legislative forays. This dy-
namic is reinforced by the fact that Netan-
yahu depends on votes from the right-wing 
fringe and is therefore willing to adopt their 
positions at times. What counts as “left-
wing” or “right-wing” in Israel, however, is 
determined by specific lines of conflict in 
Israeli society. 
“Right” and “Left” in Israel 
Two major topics determine a party’s posi-
tion on the right/left divide. In first place is 
its stance on whether the Middle East con-
flict can be peacefully settled through the 
creation of a Palestinian state or whether 
such a state would increase Israel’s threat 
levels (or whether to go as far as to annexe 
the West Bank). The second issue concerns 
the normative identity of state and society 
in Israel. What is the correct balance be-
tween Jewish and liberal-democratic norms 
in the state, and what does this mean for 
the rights of non-Jewish minorities? The fur-
ther to the “right” a party positions itself, 
the more emphasis it places on the ethnic 
and/or religious component of Jewishness 
in the Israeli state. The further to the “left”, 
the more importance it attributes to uni-
versal and pluralistic values. When repre-
sentatives of the right fringe of the political 
spectrum highlight the significance of the 
collective, they are also saying that diver-
gent opinions are virtually unacceptable 
and that non-Jewish parts of the population 
do not belong. Arab parties, on the other 
hand, are outside the left-right divide since 
they strive for a “state for all citizens” in-
stead of a Jewish state. And yet even for 
them, that binary pattern forms the politi-
cal frame of reference. 
With the partial exception of Kulanu, all 
parties in government are from the right of 
the political landscape (see diagram). Never-
theless, there is a certain bandwidth of posi-
tions within the coalition, which ranges from 
liberal conservative to strictly religious to 
a populist or radical right. The latter wants 
to annexe all settlements in the West Bank, 
something a majority of the Liberal Con-
servatives is sceptical about. Similar differ-
ences exist on constitutional issues. While 
the right-wing populists of several parties 
are pressing for substantive liberal-demo-
cratic rights to be curtailed in favour of 
Jewish group rights, the Liberal Conserva-
tives are making more of an effort to bal-
ance individual and group rights. 
This constellation has become particu-
larly explosive since Netanyahu realised 
during the last elections of 2015 (which he 
nearly lost) that his only hope of remaining 
in office as Prime Minister was to consoli-
date his position inside the Right and en-
sure that Likud provides the largest of the 
Knesset fractions. Given the coalition’s nar-
row majority (67 out of 120 seats), several 
of its members would be able to topple the 
government. This forces the Prime Minister 
on occasion to adopt populist right-wing 
stances. Over the past few years, he has 
repeatedly proved his ideological flexibility 
and shown that he will not shy away from 
populism when he deems it opportune. The 
coalition government therefore finds itself 
in a sort of permanent election campaign 
for the votes of the right-wing fringe. Poli-
ticians feel obliged to prove that they are 
the true representatives of the Israeli Right. 
Members of Jewish Home, Likud and Yisrael 
Beitenu in particular try to outbid each 
other in political motions, statements and 
legislative bills. Most of these are incapable 
of obtaining a majority and are only in-
tended to force their topics onto the agenda 
so as to shift the political discourse. Only 
rarely are populist initiatives successful 
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Heuristic diagram: 
Parties’ positions within the Israeli parliamentary system 
 
enough to be cast into law, for instance as 
a transparency law for NGOs funded from 
abroad or a law that regulates the exclusion 
of parliamentarians from the Knesset. 
Right-wing populist forays 
One of the best-known attempts is the re-
current demand put forward by justice 
minister Ayelet Shaked (Jewish Home) that 
the powers of the Supreme Court, seen as 
too liberal, be curtailed. In this matter, 
she has support of several Likud members 
(including Ze’ev Elkin and Yariv Levin). At 
the start of the legislative period, Shaked 
submitted a draft bill that would have 
empowered the Knesset to overrule Su-
preme Court verdicts. Moti Yogev (Jewish 
Home) even called for the court building 
to be bulldozed. Equally controversial was 
a proposal by culture and sports minister 
Miri Regev (Likud) that would make fund-
ing of cultural and artistic facilities depend-
ent on their loyalty towards the state. It is 
no secret that Regev denies that left-wing 
or Arab artists possess such loyalty. She 
sent questionnaires to artists asking them 
whether they would be willing to appear 
in West Bank settlements. If not, their state 
funding would be cut. All Jewish Home par-
liamentarians – but also many of Likud’s 
(including Tzipi Hotovely, Miri Regev, Danny 
Danon und Yariv Levin) – de facto demand 
the annexation of the Jewish settlements 
in the West Bank. Shaked currently spear-
heads this movement by tenaciously draft-
ing laws in support of its efforts. As recently 
as May 2016, she proposed to extend Israeli 
Yisrael Beitenu (6) 
Jewish republican 
Kulanu (10) 
Liberal democratic 
In favour of two-state 
settlement 
Reject two-state 
settlement 
Shas (7) 
Yesh Atid (11) 
Meretz (5) 
Zionist Union (24) 
United Arab List* 
(13) 
Likud  
(30 seats) 
Jewish  
Home (8) 
Torah 
Judaism (6) 
*  In many regards, the Arab List escapes this 
divide, partly because the parties it consists of 
adopt divergent points of view. None supports 
the idea of a Jewish state, and each has a dif-
ferent stance on the two-state settlement. 
As of August 2016 
Parties in government 
are shown in italics. 
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civil law to the settlements to legally har-
monise them with Israel. Education minis-
ter Naftali Bennett (Jewish Home) deleted 
the short story “Borderlife” from the state-
school syllabus because it revolves around 
the romantic relationship between a Jewish 
Israeli woman and a Palestinian man. Knes-
set members Bezalel Smotrich and Nissan 
Slomiansky (both Jewish Home) submitted 
a law proposal to make Jewish religious 
law (Halakha) the main reference point for 
judges in cases where the legal position is 
unclear. Defence minister Avigdor Lieber-
man (Yisrael Beiteinu) has also made his 
name with a series of similar initiatives. 
His party has submitted a draft law for the 
reintroduction of the death penalty. Lieber-
man also summoned the head of program-
ming of Galei Zahal, the army radio, and 
insisted that poems by the prize-winning 
Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish – 
which had previously (and remarkably) 
been broadcast by the network – should 
be categorised as seditious. 
As mentioned above, most of these pro-
posals are incapable of gaining a parlia-
mentary majority from the outset. Shaked’s 
draft law on the Knesset overruling the Su-
preme Court, for instance, was doomed to 
failure, if for no other reason than Kulanu’s 
veto on this point, which is guaranteed by 
the coalition agreement. Regardless of such 
facts, these initiatives often shape national 
and international reporting. Clearly the 
populist right-wing, which makes up about 
a third of the coalition, is in a position to 
drive the rest of the government before it. 
The aim of these forays is not to write new 
legislation, but to open up social discourse 
to views that have hitherto been considered 
unacceptable. 
The conflict between education minister 
Bennett and Prime Minister Netanyahu 
in late July 2016 was an expression of this 
development. The two politicians repeated-
ly insulted each other for being “left-wing”, 
as each tried to present himself as the bet-
ter representative of the Israeli Right. How-
ever, there is also opposition to this popu-
list right-wing discourse. More moderate 
coalition politicians – including many Kula-
nu parliamentarians, but also Likud mem-
bers such as Benny Begin or Gila Gamliel – 
have been registering their objections, at 
times strongly. Defence minister Moshe 
Ya’alon (Likud) and environmental pro-
tection minister Avi Gabai (Kulanu) stepped 
down in May 2016 in protest against grow-
ing right-wing populism. 
The successes of populist politics 
The political dynamic described above not 
only alters discourses, it also produces 
tangible political results, as two recently 
adopted laws demonstrate. 
The first is the high-profile “NGO law”, 
which in actual fact is only a change to an 
existing law. It stipulates that NGOs deriv-
ing more than half of their funding from 
foreign governments or international 
organisations must state so at all official 
appearances and in all official correspond-
ence. Whilst a clause requiring representa-
tives of such NGOs to wear a corresponding 
sticker in Parliament was dropped, the law 
is nonetheless explosive: 25 of the 27 orga-
nisations expected to be affected are 
considered regime critics. It is true that 
right-leaning Israeli NGOs also receive large 
parts of their funding from abroad, espe-
cially the US. However, these monies mostly 
come from private donations, which are 
not covered by the law. The new legislation 
thus seems tailor-made for publicly branding 
organisations that are critical of the govern-
ment as being controlled from abroad and 
‘un-Israeli’. It is also having socio-political 
repercussions. The nationalist NGO Im 
Tirtzu, for instance, has openly described 
the organisations concerned as “foreign 
agents” and drawn a direct connection 
between their work, the funding from 
abroad and terrorist attacks. Whilst politi-
cians consistently criticise this and similar 
statements as being exaggerated, that can-
not change the fact that, only a few years 
ago, a contribution of this sort to the politi-
cal discourse would have been completely 
out of the question. 
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A second example is the revision of the 
Basic Law ‘The Knesset’. It has enabled Par-
liament to vote to exclude individual mem-
bers for perpetrating racist hate crimes or 
supporting the armed fight against Israel. 
The catalyst was a visit of condolence by 
three parliamentarians from the United 
Arab List to the families of Palestinians who 
had been killed while carrying out a terror 
attack – a visit no doubt also intended to 
provoke. In the original draft bill, a simple 
majority of 61 of the 120 members would 
have sufficed to justify any exclusion. The 
version that was finally adopted, however, 
stipulates that at least 70 Knesset members 
have to agree just to trigger the process, 
including at least ten from the opposition. 
Any exclusion would require the consent 
of at least 90 parliamentarians, a number 
unlikely to be reached in Israel’s multi-
party system. 
The law nevertheless remains democrati-
cally questionable in both theoretical and 
practical terms because it merges the tasks 
of the judiciary and the legislative, and 
waters down fundamental political rights 
in favour of majority decision-making. It is 
another expression of the tendency (typical 
of populist politics) towards a majoritarian 
democracy, which attempts to remove legal 
or constitutional barriers to parliamentary 
decisions. Having said that, these laws have 
certainly also shown that populist motions 
are attenuated by the parliamentary pro-
cess, especially by resistance by parts of the 
coalition. Still, these examples do indicate a 
rightward dynamic in Israeli politics. They 
were only made possible by the situation 
in the Israeli parliament, which in turn is 
directly linked to parties’ positions on the 
peace process: the more closely parties 
agree on this subject, the more likely they 
are to form a coalition. 
The peace process with the Palestin-
ians and coalition-building in Israel 
The last two governments exemplify mecha-
nisms of coalition-building in Israel. In 2013 
parliamentary elections became necessary 
because in 2012 the Supreme Court had 
criticised a law exempting the ultraortho-
dox from military service, demanding that 
it be revised. This left their parties, Shas 
and United Torah Judaism, no option but 
to resign from government. The ensuing 
elections brought in a coalition of parties 
from different ideological stripes, including 
centrist parties. Irrespective of personal 
animosities, it was obvious that sooner or 
later the two major social faultlines – the 
peace process and national identity – would 
play a material role in keeping the peace 
within the coalition. The government col-
lapsed after only two years, halfway into its 
term, over at times violent disagreements. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that, wher-
ever possible, coalitions are created out of 
parties that are ideologically close to each 
other. 
And yet the situation is more complex 
than it might at first appear. In the current 
right-wing coalition, stances on the peace 
process, for instance, vary greatly. Whilst 
all parties share a certain scepticism, Jewish 
Home and parts of Likud categorically 
reject a two-state settlement. Other Likud 
members see such as settlement a theoreti-
cally possible, but not feasible for the time 
being. Foreign minister Lieberman formu-
lated his own proposal for a two-state solu-
tion, which called for Arabs living in Israel 
to be resettled. The topic is not a top prior-
ity for the ultra-orthodox parties, Shas and 
United Torah Judaism. However, they tend 
to be critical of the idea, and especially 
the division of Jerusalem. In the governing 
coalition, only Kulanu’s chairman, Moshe 
Kahlon, has recently called for a resumption 
of peace negotiations. 
The picture becomes more complicated 
still if one takes in the rest of the political 
landscape. With the exception of a few 
voices from the Arab List, all parties sup-
port a two-state settlement, although there 
are different estimations of whether and 
how it might be realised. What is not con-
tested is that steps towards a two-state 
settlement are overdue. The closer a party 
is to the political centre (Yesh Atid, parts 
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of the Zionist Union), the more strongly it 
campaigns for unilateral action, meaning a 
withdrawal from some of the areas without 
negotiation. The further left (other parts of 
the Zionist Union, Meretz, Arab List), the 
more it demands negotiations. 
The situation is, then, as follows: most 
Israeli members of parliament fundamen-
tally regard the two-state settlement as 
the best hope for resolving the Middle East 
conflict (as compared to a one-state settle-
ment, for instance). At the same time, a 
majority believes that the process cannot 
currently be realised with the Palestinians. 
It does not trust the ability or willingness 
of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to prevent 
attacks from within Palestinian territory. 
This largely concurs with the views of 
Israeli society: while there is still a (narrow) 
majority in support of the two-state settle-
ment, only 11 percent believe that it can 
be brought about in the next ten years. 
Both Israel’s coalition-building mecha-
nisms and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s 
changeable position on the peace process – 
which oscillates between a cautious first-
time support of the theoretical possibility 
(2009 keynote address) and a categorical 
rejection of a Palestinian state (2015 elec-
tion campaign) – must be viewed against 
this backdrop. There are a number of 
reasons for his unsteadiness on this matter. 
On the one hand, as prime minister, he 
cannot ignore the majority of the popula-
tion, which is prepared to consider a two-
state settlement, at least in theory. Inter-
national pressure has surely played a role 
here as well. On the other hand, a number 
of factors argue against such a settlement 
from Netanyahu’s point of view. As a rep-
resentative of the classical school of thought 
on Israeli security, he proceeds on the 
premise that Israel is locked in a perma-
nent battle for survival, which requires 
military strength, above all else. In addi-
tion, he is deeply suspicious of the Pales-
tinians and has – at least at the moment – 
substantial doubts about the possibility of 
a peace agreement with them. Any peace 
would have to guarantee Israel’s security, 
but the representatives of Israel’s security 
mentality believe – and probably not entirely 
without cause – that PA President Abbas is 
unable to commit the Palestinians bindingly 
on this issue. 
Even if Netanyahu was a keen enthusiast 
of a two-state settlement – which he is not – 
his political career would be unlikely to sur-
vive a change of policy on this issue. The 
departure of any party with more than six 
seats would be enough to deprive the cur-
rent coalition of its majority. A coalition 
that includes opposition parties, however, 
would also be difficult for Netanyahu. Since 
they would in all probability push for mak-
ing progress on the peace process, such a 
constellation would mean the end of either 
the coalition or Netanyahu’s mandate as 
prime minister. A substantial section of the 
Likud parliamentary party categorically re-
jects two states as a solution to the Middle 
East conflict. Should this possibility be dis-
cussed seriously in future peace negotia-
tions, opponents within Likud would pre-
sumably splinter off from the rest of the 
fraction, as happened under Sharon in 
2005 when Israel withdrew from Gaza. 
Should that occur, Netanyahu would no 
longer have the largest parliamentary party 
in the Knesset behind him and would be 
forced to resign as prime minister. 
These circumstances express the dilemma 
of Israeli politics. Whilst a majority of 
Knesset members argues in favour of a two-
state settlement at least in principle, the 
party-political constellation only produces 
coalitions that work against it. 
Netanyahu’s current position is there-
fore relatively clear: he does not reject the 
principle of a peace process, but he certainly 
does not believe that it can be successful 
either. This is reflected in his attitude to the 
current drive for a new round of the peace 
process. He rejects France’s initiative of pur-
suing negotiations on the basis of UN Secu-
rity Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In-
stead, he is demanding direct negotiatons 
with the Palestinians, without any param-
eters being fixed in advance. However, such 
an approach would enable each side to put 
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forward maximum demands, complicate 
finding compromises, and facilitate break-
ing off the talks – a scenario that is abso-
lutely in Netanyahu’s interests at this time. 
He skilfully headed off Egyptian President 
Sisi’s call for direct negotiations with a sug-
gestion of his own. He welcomed Sisi’s chal-
lenge in principle, but tied it to the broader 
perspective of the so-called Saudi Peace 
Initiative. Under this, if Israel reaches an 
agreement with the Palestinians on a two-
state settlement, the majority of Arab states 
will in return recognise the state of Israel. 
However, Netanyahu reversed the order. In 
a keynote address, he talked of peace nego-
tiations with the Arab states needing to 
come first. Only thereafter would he be 
willing to negotiate with the Palestinians. 
Netanyahu is thus trying to kill two birds 
with one stone. First, he is linking Israel’s 
greater regional integration in security 
matters with the remote chance of its being 
recognised by the Arab states. Second, he is 
trying to postpone indefinitely any attempt 
at solving the conflict with the Palestinians. 
Prospects and recommendations 
Has Israel moved to the right? In the short-
term at least, the answer is yes. The mod-
erate Israeli Right currently has less and 
less influence on the nation’s politics, the 
populist right-wing more and more. This 
state of affairs can be seen in the way 
ministers carry out their duties, in indi-
vidual laws, and above all in the efforts 
to define basic social norms according to 
ethnic or religious criteria. It is accompa-
nied by an attempt to curtail liberal-demo-
cratic principles, such as minority rights, 
and to limit the room for manoeuvre 
for any opposition within civil society. In 
general, the Israeli government is visibly 
distancing itself from a substantive under-
standing of democracy in its policies and 
moving closer to a pure majoritarian prin-
ciple. The growing strength of the populist 
Right has a number of causes. First, Prime 
Minister Netanyahu needs to unite as many 
right-wing voters as possible behind Likud, 
at the expense of the other right-wing par-
ties. This forces him to compete with the 
right-wing fringe for electoral votes – a 
game he is prepared to play. Second, the 
coalition only has a narrow majority. Most 
of its parties could topple the government. 
Actors on the fringes of the political spec-
trum thus have greater room for manoeuvre 
because the coalition is difficult to disci-
pline. Third, Israeli society’s frustration at 
the persistent failure of the Middle East 
peace process is a significant factor. The 
crucial criterion in Israeli politics continues 
to be the politicians’ stance towards a con-
flict resolution. The Right benefits greatly 
from the present hopelessness because it 
has always been sceptical about the peace 
process. And the opposition is currently not 
in a position to submit credible proposals 
for resolving the conflict. Not that the coali-
tion government would be able to make 
any kind of final decision in regard to the 
solution of the conflict: the right fringe 
lacks the majority for annexing the settle-
ments, and there is currently no other solu-
tion in sight. The approach that has long 
been Netanyahu’s therefore remains the 
order of the day: conflict management. The 
prime minister appears to have no political 
vision outside of his security dogma. 
This is a leverage point for European 
policy, which is anxious about the peace 
process and also wants to further substan-
tive democracy in Israel. A firm endorse-
ment of a Palestinian state remains the 
only option for settling the Middle East 
conflict, not least because there are no 
viable alternatives. The EU could be espe-
cially active in the context of Netanyahu’s 
attempted rapprochement with the Arab 
states, which is intended to exclude the 
Palestinians. In concert with those states, 
it needs to make it clear to the Israeli gov-
ernment that it cannot abandon peace 
talks with the Palestinians. 
At the same time, future peace negotia-
tions must also aim to guarantee Israel’s 
security – this continues to be Israelis’ main 
concern. A variety of measures are conceiv-
able, such as UN peacekeeping troops along 
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a future border, or a demilitarised state 
of Palestine. For despite Israel’s military 
dominance, there is a need to rebut the 
widely believed argument that it has been 
attacked after every withdrawal from ter-
ritories controlled by Israel since the start 
of the peace process. Otherwise, a majority 
for reviving the peace process will never be 
found. Given these factors and given that 
Israeli politics is currently blocking itself, 
mainly through its coalition-building 
mechanisms, good counsel from outside 
Israel appears crucial. 
This way forward also offers the oppor-
tunity of consolidating democratic insti-
tutions that have come under pressure. A 
commitment to liberal democratic values 
and support for a two-state settlement are 
clearly not the same thing, but they are 
linked. In Israel, the notion of a legitimate 
Palestinian state is above all a liberal idea. 
With the stagnation of the Middle East peace 
process, the concept of a liberal democracy 
is losing ground domestically in favour of 
national-collectivist views of the state of 
Israel. A solid new peace process will be dif-
ficult to achieve with the Netanyahu gov-
ernment, but it could bring renewed hope 
if it is set in motion together with the 
stable Arab states in the region, with Saudi 
Arabia leading the way. 
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